Rule of Law from the Bottom-up and the Inside-out: Evaluating the legitimacy of a “hybrid approach” NGO by Murray, Christopher
Christopher Murray   Lund University 
830707-8355  BIDS/Department of Political Science  
May 31, 2013  STVK12 
  Tutor: Magdalena Bexell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule of Law from the Bottom-up and the 
Inside-out 
Evaluating the legitimacy of a “hybrid approach” NGO  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christopher Murray 
 
 
  
Abstract 
Within the broader literature on civil society organisations (CSOs) there are a 
number of discussions and debates concerning how to disentangle, 
dimensionalise, and evaluate the complex concept of legitimacy. Scholars have 
presented different “dimensions”, “components”, and “types” of legitimacy, as 
well as suggestions for how to evaluate legitimacy based on the “roles” a CSO 
should play within a given context. This thesis seeks to analyse and corral these 
different theoretical and heuristic takes on CSO legitimacy into a theoretical 
framework, and then apply them to one specific case in order to explore how 
legitimacy can be evaluated empirically within this framework. The chosen case is 
International Bridges to Justice (IBJ), an international non-governmental 
organisation (INGO) that uses a “hybrid approach” to both provide legal 
assistance directly to indigent accused individuals, and to help strengthen and 
enforce already-passed legal reforms in the countries where it operates. Using this 
method, this thesis identifies some ambiguities which may arise when applying 
discrete theoretical categories to complex empirical case studies. It also notes the 
significance of “trade-offs” to the legitimacy of CSO approaches, and recognises 
that an array of CSO approaches is important to the legitimate strengthening of 
various rights.  
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1 Introduction: the legitimacy of civil 
society organisations  
In Green’s (1997) discussion of rule of law institutions, and particularly the 
community-driven bureaucratic mechanisms that enforce them throughout Africa, 
he writes that 
 
[t]he difficulties of transplantation are probably greater for western-
style non-governmental organizations (NGOs) than for bureaucracy, 
excepting perhaps some religious related organizations and, oddly, the 
Red Cross…. They are unlikely to be optimal local level community 
programme operational bodies. Detached elite membership groups of 
well-wishers (usually professionals) working for, but not accountable 
to and often not in close day-to-day human contact with, those they 
serve are not notably ‘traditional’ Africa (or perhaps anywhere else). 
They may have a future but are not a very speedy or sure route to local 
level participation and to raising the capacity of ordinary people. [ibid: 
59] 
 
Included in Green’s broad dismissal of “western-style” NGOs are several 
elements that can all be considered issues of legitimacy. Despite their good 
intentions, these organisations are “detached”, “elite” and too distant from their 
prospective beneficiaries to be truly representative. Therefore, they do not possess 
“input legitimacy.”1 They do not promote “local level participation” and they 
cannot be held “accountable” to those whom they affect. Therefore, they also do 
not possess “throughput legitimacy.” And finally, Green calls their effectiveness 
into dispute when he states that NGO intervention is not a “speedy or sure route” 
to improved capacity. This means they have little to no “output legitimacy” either. 
 Although one could argue that Green’s argument suffers considerably 
from over-generalisation, his is by no means the only voice that has accused 
NGOs, international NGOs (INGOs), or other transnational civil society 
organisations (TCSOs) of lacking legitimacy in some facet of their work. Yet, 
despite these criticisms, the proliferation of these organisations has not ceased and 
neither has their real and potential ability to influence national and international 
policy. Scholar Jan Aart Scholte, who has been publishing on this and related 
subjects for two decades, asserts in a recent article that “civil society 
organisations”, along with “national governments… suprastate institutions,” and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Input, throughput, and output legitimacy are defined and discussed in sub-chapter 3.2.2.  
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“substate agencies” are essential players in the “multiple multilateralisms” that 
comprise contemporary global governance (Scholte 2011: 112).  
 The significant role of NGOs and other TCSOs in national and global 
governance means that it is important to be able to accurately evaluate their 
legitimacy. The difficulty of doing so will be discussed in depth in the proceeding 
chapters. Evaluating legitimacy in this context requires a disassembling of the 
concept in order to determine the various ways in which it can be gained, 
maintained, or lost. This thesis’s focus is one specific type of CSO: those that 
work with state bodies (particularly in democratically weak states) and grassroots 
stakeholders to promote and strengthen national rule of law institutions from, as 
Taylor puts it, the “bottom up, and from the inside out” (Taylor 2004: see 
abstract). This is a subject for which there is a burgeoning, but still relatively 
small crop of scholarly literature (Golub 2007; Pouligny 2003; van Rooij 2012; 
Taylor 2004; Taylor 2006). The primary case study of this thesis is one such 
TCSO, the Geneva-based International Bridges to Justice (IBJ). IBJ is unusual in 
that it engages stakeholders from a cross section of society – state representatives, 
legal professionals, media, police, and grassroots civil society representatives – to 
provide legal representation to indigent people accused of crimes in the short 
term, and to instill a state-wide system of pro bono legal aid in the long term. So 
far, the organisation only maintains permanent field programmes in countries that 
have already passed the relevant rights-protection legislation into law, and 
therefore is often welcomed by states as a provider of legal technical assistance. 
 The working research question is: how can we evaluate the legitimacy of 
International Bridges to Justice? The methodology is to apply a theoretical 
framework on legitimacy to the case of IBJ; and with the goal of identifying 
broader implications within the research area, to refer to other empirical case 
studies about similar CSOs. The primary objective is to discuss how the 
legitimacy of IBJ can be evaluated using the theoretical literature. The tangential 
research objectives, methodology, and limitations of this thesis are discussed in 
the next chapter.           
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2 Methodology & Limitations 
This thesis makes use of a qualitative case study methodology. According to Yin 
(2003), this method is suited to the study of complex, “real-world situations” 
where there are many uncontrollable variables (referenced in Lieberherr 2011: 
77). The “case-study approach” also “enables analytic generalization rather than 
statistical generalization”, which “involves comparing empirical analysis to a 
previously developed theory, or proposition” (Yin 1994 paraphrased in Lieberherr 
2011: 77-78). The method of sampling is theoretical; the case and theoretical 
framework were chosen specifically because “they can illuminate a specific 
phenomenon” (Lieberherr 2011: 78, paraphrasing Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). 
In congruence with Flyvbjerg (2006), the scientific philosophy of this thesis is 
that case studies, much more than just “a method of producing anecdotes”, 
exemplify “the force of example”, and are a crucial source from which to learn 
about social phenomena.       
 As alluded to in the introduction, IBJ was chosen as an “extreme or unique 
case” (see Bryman 2008: 55). Although not the only one of its kind, IBJ’s “bottom 
up, inside out” strategy “to strengthen rule of law and ultimately democracy” 
presents us with a relatively unusual approach to legal and political development 
(Taylor 2004: abstract). Therefore, this case has the potential to deviate from 
existing theoretical models of legitimacy. IBJ operates both as an INGO/TCSO 
and as a national-level NGO in Burundi, Cambodia, China, India, Rwanda, 
Singapore, and Zimbabwe. It is headquartered in Geneva and works towards 
global objectives, most notably, a 12-year plan to end investigative torture in the 
world (IBJ.org 2013a). At the national level, it maintains local offices run by local 
staffs and is subject to state laws and authority. Therefore, my theoretical 
framework pertains to CSOs in relation to both national and global governance. 
 In line with Van Rooy’s (2004) definition, I use the terms CSO, TCSO, 
NGO, or INGO to refer to organisations that are separate from the state and the 
market, are recognisable as organisations rather than “loose constellations within 
society”, and are engaged in ensuring “moral” or “just” sociopolitical 
performance (see Van Rooy 2004: 6-10).                
           This thesis concerns the evaluation of IBJ’s democratic legitimacy, but 
also other kinds of legitimacy, such as moral and technocratic. Specifically it 
discusses how these different kinds of legitimacy can be interrelated, or traded off 
for one another. It should also be stated that this thesis is not concerned with the 
internal democratic legitimacy of CSOs, but rather legitimacy understood as the 
impact of a CSO on a country (see Pallas 2010a). The working theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 3 is a combination, and in some of its elements, a 
synthesis, of the broad definitions of legitimacy provided by Scholte (2011), 
Dingwerth (2004), and Van Rooy (2004), the specific definition of democratic 
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legitimacy provided by Uhlin (2010), the “components” of legitimacy (input, 
throughput, output) provided by, inter alia, Zȕrn, Scharpf, and Dingwerth 
(referenced in Pallas 2010a and Uhlin 2010), the other “types” of legitimacy 
(democratic, moral, legal, and technocratic) provided by Scholte (2011), the 
“dimensions” of legitimacy (participation, control, argumentative practice, and 
good results) put forward by Dingwerth (op. cit.), and the heuristic “roles” of 
TCSOs (revolutionary, advocate, agent, or authority) devised by Pallas.    
 Chapter 3’s theoretical framework is then used as a “yardstick”, a means 
to explore how we can evaluate the legitimacy of IBJ’s approach. Chapter 4 
presents three dimensions of IBJ’s approach: its general operations, its specific in-
country activities, and its real and intended impact. A discussion of how we can 
evaluate IBJ’s legitimacy in light of the theoretical framework follows in Chapter 
5. Primarily, I work from Uhlin’s table, “Questions for evaluating democratic 
legitimacy of transnational actors” and the “rules of thumb” suggested in Pallas 
(2010a), and then bring in issues raised by other authors. This method of using 
existing theoretical literature on legitimacy to evaluate specific case studies on 
TCSOs and other international organisations (IOs) has previously been employed 
by Lieberherr (op. cit.), Pallas (2010b), and Pearce (1997), amongst others.  
   The case study sources presented in Chapter 4 are a number of IBJ 
documents collected during my time as an intern with the organisation. These 
mainly constitute annual reports, post-activity reports, grant proposals, reports 
submitted to grant-giving organisations, Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) 
with government bodies and local NGOs, and promotional pieces. To a large 
extent, my research objective concerns IBJ’s approach and intentions, what it does 
and why. I have no rational reason to believe that IBJ would misrepresent what it 
does and why in its official documentation, and so I view this as valid data for my 
purposes. That having been stated, I acknowledge that many of these documents 
were created for promotional purposes; and therefore, they may skew towards 
IBJ’s virtues more than an independent report carried out by an independent 
organisation or researcher might. Further, more in-depth evaluations of IBJ’s 
activities and legitimacy will require this kind of independent documentation. I 
must also acknowledge my own positionality as a former (unpaid) employee of 
IBJ. This acknowledged, the IBJ documents I present are not for the primary 
purpose of giving evidence for IBJ’s virtues, but rather as tools for a theoretical 
discussion about how we can evaluate the legitimacy of such a CSO within a 
certain context. I am interested in presenting as critical and objective an analysis 
as possible within these constraints.    
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3 Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Legitimacy and democracy 
3.1.1 Evaluating legitimacy 
“Legitimacy rules,” writes Van Rooy, “are moving targets, difficult to describe 
and pin down on a piece of paper”:  
 
one person’s rule need not be shared by another, most are often 
implied rather than stated, many are commonly contradictory and 
habitually mutated, and all are always juggled with power 
differences…. Yet rules that are wielded without conscious 
consideration and careful examination nonetheless have very real 
consequences in shaping what decisions are made, what money is 
spent, and whose lives are affected. [Van Rooy 2004: 62]   
 
Legitimacy, like power, is not a tangible good that is either possessed or not 
possessed outside of a sociopolitical interchange. It is not created solely through 
the execution of an action, but also through how that action is understood and 
perceived by others. Moreover, that understanding and perception might change 
as new information is uncovered or as opinion shifts. Why the action was 
executed, how it was executed, who it was executed by, and what the action 
resulted in all have innate roles to play in the generation of legitimacy. Uhlin 
argues that “legitimacy should be viewed as a social construction”, and “there are 
no objective technical solutions to legitimacy problems that can be designed by 
experts independent of the context” (op. cit.: 22). He is therefore cautious about 
promoting “operational criteria” in order to measure “the democratic legitimacy of 
different [transnational actors (TNAs)]” (ibid: 33). Favouring instead to ask “how 
the different sources of democratic legitimacy are socially constructed” (ibid: 34).    
 Yet Van Rooy’s use of such an immutable concept as “rules” could be 
seen as representative of a desire among stakeholders – whether they are scholars, 
states, international organisations, civil society professionals, or individual 
citizens – to “pin down” to some extent how the legitimacy of an actor or action is 
evaluated before, during, and after the event. To do this necessitates a good degree 
of abstraction and a reliance on heuristics. For example, Van Rooy’s assertion that 
“legitimacy depends on acceptance of (any actor’s) grounds for representativity” 
might be a useful heuristic for furthering the debate; however, by definition it tells 
us little about complex empirical reality (op. cit.: 68). In reality, particularly the 
reality of transnational governance and policymaking, those who must “accept” an 
actor’s “grounds for representativity” in order to generate legitimacy could be a 
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multitudinous and diverse lot. If only a small minority of people accept the 
grounds for representativity of an actor, does that mean that the actor carries 
legitimacy, albeit in low quantity? How about if that small number of “acceptors” 
has greater authority to do the accepting? What if, in turn, the legitimacy of that 
group’s authority is not accepted by some portion of those they represent or 
affect?  In order to evaluate a CSO’s legitimacy, particularly its democratic 
legitimacy, it is necessary to define what we mean by “representativity” and other 
elements of democracy beyond the more familiar context of national governance.    
      
3.1.2 Defining democratic legitimacy 
The post-war era of globalisation, however this term is defined, has meant an 
increased number and diversity of actors with the power to affect policy, directly 
or indirectly, at the global and the state level. Economic globalisation and the rise 
of transnational corporations (TNCs), the formation of international organisations 
(IOs), such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the African 
Union, and a proliferation of TCSOs and philanthropic organisations have all 
created a world where the lines between constituencies are blurred and the nation 
state is not the lone, or in some cases, not even the most important power wielder. 
However, as Uhlin points out, “the democratic credentials of these actors are all 
challenged” (op. cit.: 16). One reason for this is immediately apparent: who do 
these organisations legitimately represent? Have democratic principles and 
mechanisms been present in the election of representatives or the passing of 
international legislation? Are there mechanisms in place so that the demos can 
hold policymakers to account for undesirable, or undesired, outcomes2?   
 On the other hand, as Van Rooy observes, CSOs have frequently been 
championed as the solution to the problem of national and global democratic 
deficits, rather than as a potential part of it. “Civil society,” she writes, “is… often 
described as a necessary tool for ensuring democracy” (op. cit.: 9). This is 
because, in theory, CSOs have the potential to act as an ombudsman between the 
public and the state, or between the public and other organisations. Van Rooy 
cites a 1992 book by Siegel and Yancey when she lists the following “essential 
democratic functions” that CSOs perform: 
 
• Providing a means for expressing and actively addressing the varied 
and complex needs of society. 
• Motivating individuals to act as citizens in all aspects of society rather 
than bowing to or depending on state power and beneficence.  
• Promoting pluralism and diversity in society, such as protecting and 
strengthening cultural, ethnic, religious linguistic, and other identities. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 For a theoretical discussion about accountability in global governance and the global demos see 
Grant & Keohane (2005) and Goodin (2007).  
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• Creating an alternative to centralized state agencies for providing 
services with greater independence and flexibility.  
• Establishing the mechanisms by which governments and the market 
can be held accountable by the public [ibid: 9-10] 
 
Van Rooy adds that “just because CSOs can do such things does not mean they 
necessarily do carry them out” (ibid: 10, emphasis in original). It follows that 
Siegel and Yancy would probably judge a CSO’s democratic legitimacy by how 
well it serves these functions. As an example of how democratic legitimacy is 
context-specific, it is important here to note that Siegel and Yancy are writing 
about then “recent Central and East European transitions”, and thus many of their 
criteria for democratic legitimacy relate to moving governance in a more 
pluralistic direction away from the centralised, communist state. However, 
according to Dingwerth (op. cit.), pluralism is only one model for democratic 
legitimacy at the global level. 
 In his summary of “empirical papers on democratic governance beyond 
the state”, Dingwerth identifies several “models” of democratic legitimacy: 
“constitutional approaches” -- theory of the world (minimal) state and 
cosmopolitan democracy -- pluralistic approaches, and deliberative or discursive 
democracy. The first two are models that include “more government”, the third 
includes “less government”, and the fourth includes “more discourse” (ibid). He 
defines “the pure” normative doctrine of pluralism as: 
 
the acknowledgement that modern societies are characterised by a 
high degree of social differentiation, a diversity of life styles, and a 
plurality of interests. In these diverse societies, independent 
organisations act as intermediate institutions through which interests 
can be aggregated and articulated. The approach assumes that, in 
principal, all interests can be articulated and organised and that a 
balance between these interests can be achieved. [ibid: 14] 
 
The democratic legitimacy of a CSO in this pluralistic sense could thus be 
evaluated for how well it manages to “aggregate and articulate” the interests of 
those it represents. The democratic legitimacy of civil society in general could be 
evaluated for how well the entire sector manages to strike a balance between all 
the different interests in society. Dingwerth finds that pluralistic approaches are 
preferable to constitutional approaches for transnational governance because they 
omit vertical organisation in favour of horizontal organisation, and state-centrism 
in favour of polycentrism. However, he concludes that pluralistic approaches are 
less preferential than deliberative approaches for transnational governance, 
because it is most often the case that disparities in resources between 
“intermediate institutions” are such that no true pluralistic balance can be realised. 
 Deliberative democracy derives its legitimacy from the process of 
“collective will-formation”; policy is formulated through procedural deliberation 
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or “mutual reason-giving”, where all who have a stake in the outcome of a 
decision3 are given an opportunity to contribute to that decision (ibid: 15). Within 
this model, a policy or law is  
 
legitimate only if it is based on the public reasons resulting from an 
inclusive and fair process of deliberation in which all citizens may 
participate and in which they may continue to cooperate freely. 
[Bohman cited in Dingwerth 2004: 16] 
 
 Dingwerth concludes that the deliberative model “seems most suitable for 
transnational governance” because it “rel[ies] on a horizontal mode of political 
coordination, combin[es] aspects of input, throughout and output legitimacy, 
and… combin[es] the democratic quality of procedures with concerns about 
socializing and civilizing effects” (ibid: 20). However, he also asserts that the 
deliberative model is also “attractive for local and national politics” (ibid: 18). If 
we agree with him, then should the democratic legitimacy of a TCSO be evaluated 
by the extent to which it practices and promotes this all-inclusive process of 
collective decision-making at the national and transnational levels? 
    
3.2  “Dimensions”, “components”, “types”, and 
“roles” 
3.2.1 “Dimensions” of legitimacy: representation and participation 
Dingwerth proposes four “dimensions” or “sources” of legitimacy in order to 
evaluate the legitimacy of “rule-making-processes” at the national and 
transnational levels; these are: participation or inclusiveness, democratic control, 
argumentative practice, and good results (op. cit.: 20). This sub-chapter focuses 
specifically on the first of these; the last three are discussed in tandem with the 
“components” of legitimacy in sub-chapter 3.2.2.   
 Participation refers to those who are included, and how they are included, 
in a decision-making process. It is a “core element of democratic theory”, as one 
can  
 
hardly speak of democratic legitimacy where none of the individuals 
subject to a collective decision has taken part in its making. In turn, it 
goes without saying that decision-making equally implies individuals 
that actually make a decision; in other words, any decision-making 
process presupposes at least some degree of participation. The real 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) suggest that, in practice, an advocate or group of advocates could be 
chosen to “give reasons” for a certain position, thus averting problems of scale.   
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question of democratic legitimacy is therefore not so much about 
whether there is participation, but to what extent those who are subject 
to a decision have been included in the decision-making process. 
[ibid: 21] 
   
Dingwerth splits the term into two different aspects: “scope” and “quality”, while 
Uhlin uses the term “inclusion” to mean scope and the term “participation” to 
mean quality. Participatory quality refers to the degree to which the members of a 
constituency are actively involved in a decision-making process; scope refers to 
who is given the opportunity to participate.  
 The primary normative and practical challenge of participatory scope or 
inclusion is to identify “the proper constituency or demos concerning a specific 
issue” (Uhlin 2010: 26). “Ideally,” Uhlin writes, “all those significantly affected 
by a decision should participate directly in decision-making”, although this “‘all-
affected principle’ suffers from both practical and normative problems” (ibid; and 
see Goodin 2007; Erman & Uhlin 2010). It should be noted that in a liberal 
democratic state, participation is intertwined with “representation”, another 
potential source of legitimacy according to Uhlin. Specifically, it is one of the key 
participatory activities of the constituency of a liberal democracy to elect a 
representative. Uhlin differentiates between “representative democrats”, those 
who emphasise “formal mechanisms” of democracy, such as “election of 
leadership”, and “participatory democrats”, who are more “concerned with the 
actual inclusion of affected people”; however, in the case of transnational 
governance, including cases that involve TCSOs, formal mechanisms of direct 
representation are not as present, and therefore participatory scope is even more 
important as a criterion of legitimacy (ibid). 
 On the subject of NGOs, Van Rooy writes about representation and 
participatory scope as if they are by and large the same: 
 
Groups are thought to be representative if their members are of a 
certain character, quality, or quantity. What numbers of people are 
involved? How encompassing is the membership? Does it cover all 
those who matter? [op. cit.: 63] 
 
The “volume”, “breadth”, and “depth” of an organisation’s “membership” – those 
included in the initiatives of the NGO -- are important to their legitimacy because 
they indicate the organisation’s authority to represent those they claim to. While 
volume (size) and depth (commitment) of membership are important, 
“globalization activists (and some of their skeptics) put greater weight on the 
character of that membership”, or the breadth (ibid: 64). A wide breadth of 
participation would mean a broad cross-section of stakeholders is included in the 
decision-making process. When a broad or comprehensive scope is not present, it 
can mean the representatives of a CSO are “speaking on behalf” of their intended 
beneficiaries without the legitimate authority to do so. Also, the absence of a 
broad participatory scope could lead to the undue influence of the “loud 
minority”, when “’minority’ views… unduly sway public policy” (ibid: 65).  
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 Van Rooy argues that one “response” to too-narrow participatory scope 
has been to “re-jig the debate in terms of ‘partnership’” (ibid: 68). She writes that 
“partnership” is “code for the desire for more equitable power relations between 
Northern and Southern organizations involved in joint efforts” (ibid). In practice, 
this has meant “new experiments in cooperation”, the inclusion of “Southerners 
on boards of directors”, and sometimes the movement of “responsibility entirely 
to Southern directors” (ibid).                                
  
3.2.2 “Components” of legitimacy 
The complexity of legitimacy, how it can be gained, maintained, or lost by 
different actors in different contexts, and especially how it can be affected by the 
action to outcome relationship in different actors’ approaches, makes it desirable 
to employ the three chronological “components”4 of legitimacy: input, 
throughput, and output. Uhlin frames his discussion around these components by 
way of establishing questions we can ask about a transnational actor’s legitimacy, 
but most of these, congruent with Dingwerth, could also apply to local and 
national politics (op. cit.). Uhlin’s table is included in Chapter 5.     
 Input legitimacy is usually said to subsume the two attributes discussed in 
sub-chapter 3.2.1: representation and participatory scope/inclusion (Uhlin 2010; 
Pallas 2010a; Dingwerth 2004). Throughput legitimacy concerns the second and 
third of Dingwerth’s four dimensions: democratic control, which subsumes 
transparency and accountability (op. cit.: 22), and argumentative practice, or 
“deliberation” as it is referred to by Uhlin (op. cit.: 31). Much has been written, 
and much more could be written, on the throughput-related concepts, transparency 
and accountability. However, they are secondary to the focus of this thesis and so 
will only be defined briefly.   
 Democratic control is the extent to which “the governed can… influence 
the behaviour of the governors” and can be considered a “passive form[…] of 
participation” (Dingwerth 2004: 22). A good general definition of transparency is  
 
the extent to which individuals who may be significantly affected by a 
decision are able to learn about the decision-making process, 
including its existence, subject matter, structure and current status. 
[Dingwerth cited in Uhlin 2010: 26] 
 
Accountability is summed up by Grant & Keohane as a proposition that  
 
some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to 
judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 These three terms are referred to as “components” in Pallas 2010a.  
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standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these 
responsibilities have not been met. [Grant & Keohane 2005: 29] 
 
Therefore, “effective accountability requires mechanisms for information and 
communication between decision-makers and stakeholders and mechanisms for 
imposing penalties” (Uhlin 2010: 27). As with participatory scope, one of the 
essential difficulties of accountability in practice is identifying a constituency. To 
whom should the actor be made accountable? In their study, in which they 
measure the accountability of several transnational NGOs, Piewitt et. al. (2010) 
explain that transnational NGOs are often concerned with their accountability to 
several groups of stakeholders: their members, their donors (which frequently 
includes state governments), and the general public. 
 The quality of deliberation, according to Uhlin, should be evaluated by 
means of “critical reflection” (op. cit.: 31). In a system of deliberative democracy, 
judged most suitable for transnational governance by Dingwerth, there must be a 
“genuine willingness to adjust one’s position in response to rational arguments” 
(ibid). Interestingly, Uhlin points out that “the coercive and confrontational 
methods” of some TCSOs “do not fit well within a deliberative democratic 
framework” (ibid). 
 Output legitimacy refers to consequences. How can we evaluate the 
legitimacy of a TCSO based on their results? Using a broad definition of 
legitimacy, this means that legitimacy can be generated in a national or 
transnational context through “good results”, or how “the substance of a decision 
enhances the common good” (Dingwerth 2004: 26). However, with regard to 
democratic legitimacy, Uhlin raises an important point of divergence. Democratic 
output legitimacy, as defined by Uhlin, does not mean a TNA’s effectiveness, but 
a TNA’s “democratizing impact on global governance” (op. cit.: 32). As we shall 
see in sub-chapter 3.2.4, democratic output legitimacy can also be taken to mean 
the democratizing impact of a CSO on a specific country (Pallas 2010a). 
Importantly, Uhlin also notes that TNAs might have to make trade-offs “between 
democratic and non-democratic aspects of output legitimacy” in order to meet 
their objectives (op. cit.: 32).            
 Before moving on to the next section, it should be added that the clean 
lines of demarcation between input, throughput, and output legitimacy only exist 
theoretically. As Uhlin writes, “the different democratic values organized under 
the input, throughput, and output headings are interrelated” (ibid: 23). For 
example, comprehensive participatory scope, greater transparency, deliberation, 
and accountability could just as well be outcomes of an NGO initiative, rather 
than inputs or throughput.   
3.2.3 “Types” of legitimacy 
The legitimacy of CSOs is not only evaluated by its democratic qualities, but also 
by its ethical, altruistic, or social justice-enhancing qualities. Of course, the two 
are related – stronger democratic institutions can theoretically lead to stronger 
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social justice – but because we are working from a clear definition of democratic 
legitimacy provided by Uhlin, it may also be useful to define some other types of 
legitimacy.      
 Scholte argues that 
 
To date, mainstream perspectives have tended to adopt a technocratic 
approach, whereby a global governance arrangement would acquire 
legitimacy on the basis of efficient delivery of material objectives 
such as welfare, security and sustainability…. Yet for legitimacy to be 
deeper and more solid it must also have other grounds besides 
technical performance, including legality, democracy, morality and 
charismatic leadership. [op. cit.: 114).  
 
This is not to say that CSOs or other actors cannot earn legitimacy through 
providing effective technical assistance, indeed many of them do. However, 
effective technical assistance is not always enough. Pallas notes that effective 
service provision can even be deleterious to democratic legitimacy because it may 
“prop up an undemocratic state, even as it mitigates its impact on its citizens” 
(Pallas 2010a: 227). Along these same lines, Scholte argues that legality is one 
necessary criterion to differentiate between the legitimate service provision of 
organisations such as UNICEF, and the illegitimate service provision (no matter 
how effective it is) of “Triad societies and the Cosa Nostra” (op. cit.: 114). 
Legality also provides legitimacy in transnational governance due to the 
“informal” nature of some TNAs. Particularly when paramilitary groups, 
“transgovernmental networks of civil servants”, and “corporate responsibility 
schemes” are often able to operate with little transparency, accountability, and are 
even able to circumvent the rule of law (ibid: 115).         
  With regard to moral legitimacy, Scholte offers several examples of how 
initiatives based in moral concerns are often able to gain legitimacy. For instance: 
the UN “bolstered its legitimacy by galvanizing opposition to apartheid in South 
Africa”; the Kimberley Process “owes its legitimacy largely to the morally right 
cause of suppressing trade” in blood diamonds; and “the Global Fund attracts 
support for its just purpose of alleviating human suffering in epidemics” (ibid: 
116). Interestingly, Scholte also asserts that the legitimacy of TNAs can also be 
earned through charismatic leadership, “the capacity to inspire and mobilize 
followers” (ibid: 116). This view of legitimacy as something based in 
personalities, or how the governed relate and are inspired by their governors, 
seems like a fascinating avenue for further research, but it is too difficult to 
evaluate using the material I have at this time.       
3.2.4 Pallas’s four “roles” 
Another important theoretical aspect of legitimacy for this thesis is provided by 
Pallas (2010a). Building on Uhlin’s definition of democratic legitimacy and 
context-specific framing of legitimacy evaluation, as well as the debates 
surrounding the behaviour of CSOs, governance, and policy-making in general, 
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Pallas suggests four context-determined “roles” that a CSO does, or should, play 
in order to be considered democratically legitimate. To be clear, it is democratic 
legitimacy that Pallas is concerned with, rather than the other types presented in 
sub-chapter 3.2.3. However, Pallas includes in his definition of democracy both 
“popular sovereignty” and “the protection of citizen rights”, without qualifying 
that these need to be understood as political rights (ibid: 223). Because Pallas does 
not “enumerate these rights in detail”, democratic legitimacy, in his definition, 
could include the protection of due process rights, ESC rights, or more 
controversial rights (ibid: 223).    
 With regard to democratic legitimacy, Pallas argues, “CSOs actually 
operate in three different contexts”: undemocratic states, such as “Eastern Europe 
or apartheid South Africa”, democratic states, which “have some measure of 
liberal democracy and… are acknowledged as democratic by their peers”, and the 
international realm, “where they are often beyond the control of any one state or 
institution” (ibid: 225). Within these three contexts, a CSO can be a 
“revolutionary, advocate, agent, or authority”, and their democratic legitimacy, 
Pallas argues, can be evaluated based on how well they fill that role in that context 
(ibid). 
 Pallas’s “advocates” only operate in a democratic context where the state 
guarantees democratic rights (ibid: 227). These CSOs “can enhance the 
democratic rights of a state’s citizens by monitoring or facilitating state 
processes” (ibid). Pallas argues that the legitimacy of these actors should be 
“judged on either input or throughput”, or their representativity and how well they 
“support the practices of transparency, accountability, and deliberation” to 
“enhance democracy” (ibid). However, advocates should never be judged by 
output legitimacy, because in a democratic state, it is the government, not CSOs, 
who should be responsible for outcomes (ibid). Pallas’s “advocates” heuristic is 
generally in agreement with Van Rooy and Uhlin, while also supplying a useful, 
context-specific “rule of thumb.” 
 “Agents” are those CSOs “acting on behalf of an established authority”, 
such as the government, in a formal capacity (ibid: 228). According to Pallas, 
these CSOs’ democratic legitimacy  
 
must be judged by the democratic credentials of the state or institution 
on whose behalf it acts. If a CSO acts on behalf of a democratic state, 
it may be considered democratic; if it acts on behalf of an 
undemocratic one, it may be considered as undemocratic because of 
the type of regime it is supporting. [ibid]  
 
 “Authorities” are those CSOs that are either formally participating “in 
international decision-making” or are engaged in “global policymaking” through 
the “propagation of international norms” (ibid: 229). This would include CSOs 
such as IBJ, who are engaged globally in efforts to change and/or enforce state 
policy to make it congruent with international norms such as those found in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Because, at present, “no enforceable 
democratic rights exist” for politics at the global level, Pallas argues that 
“authorities” must be judged by the same inputs and outputs – “equal 
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representation, respon[ce] to citizen control, and protect[ion of] fundamental 
rights – as other “international actors” (ibid: 230).  
 Finally, “revolutionary” CSOs are those operating in undemocratic states. 
Pallas argues that a CSO in this context “must be legitimated by its efforts to 
reform or replace the existing regime” (ibid: 227). A CSO not engaged in this 
endeavour in an undemocratic state may earn moral or technocratic legitimacy, 
but it does not earn democratic legitimacy. Also, “revolutionaries” “should be 
judged purely on outputs”; this is because “representation, participation, or 
transparency is meaningless if national democracy is not established” (ibid). 
Throughout Pallas’s article, is also seems to be tacit that a “revolutionary” CSO is 
in a position of confrontation with the existing regime. The possibility that a CSO 
might “reform or replace the existing regime” in a cooperative manner is not 
explored. For example, Pallas defends his evaluation of the legitimacy of 
“revolutionary” CSOs by stating that 
 
[t]he literature on civil society and national democratizations clearly 
reflects the standards of the revolutionary role. Such literature 
describes undemocratic regimes and judges civil society, usually 
positively, for its role in contesting them. [ibid: 230, emphasis added] 
 
Although he is in accordance with other scholarly literature, I find the 
“revolutionary” heuristic the most problematic for two reasons.  
 First, Pallas states that “[f]or the sake of parsimony” he does not qualify 
the different degrees of democracy a regime might exist in along a continuum 
(ibid: 225). Doing so might have been outside of his scope, but it seems that not 
doing so creates unnecessary ambiguities. For example, imagine a state that is 
deemed undemocratic according to political rights measurement organisations, 
such as Freedom House, but has passed some civil and/or political rights 
legislation, but does not have the resources or state capacity to properly enforce it. 
Should a CSO working with an “undemocratic” state to strengthen capacity to 
enforce laws that could have a democratizing impact be deemed democratically 
illegitimate? In a simplistic way, this scenario describes IBJ’s work in Rwanda 
and Zimbabwe.  
 Second has to do with intention. Pallas states that legitimacy should be 
based on a CSO’s “efforts”, but then also states that it needs to be judged entirely 
on outcomes. If we interpret “efforts” to mean intentions – not passive “good 
intentions”, but active, effective intentions – than this seems more of an input than 
an output. If a CSO puts its best efforts into improving democracy within a 
country, but fails, should it be judged illegitimate? How long does the 
organisation get to succeed before it is judged to be a failure, and thus 
democratically illegitimate? Both of these points have implications for Chapter 4 
and 5.      
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4 Analysis: International Bridges to 
Justice 
4.1 General operations 
Karen Tse, the public defender, United Nations consultant, and Unitarian 
Universalist minister who founded IBJ, received her inspiration from a trip to 
Cambodia: 
 
I remember peering through the bars of a cell in Cambodia and talking 
with a young boy who had been detained, tortured by the police, and 
was languishing in prison…. Like most prisoners in Cambodia, he had 
no lawyer or human rights worker to defend him or safeguard his 
rights, and he had no pending trial date to determine his guilt or 
innocence. I flashed back to ten years before, to my college days of 
organizing letter-writing campaign for political prisoners. We had 
demanded that they be free from torture and be granted their right to 
fair and speedy trials. But as I came face to face with this young boy, I 
realized that neither I nor my fellow student would have written a 
letter for him. He was not a political prisoner; he was just an 
unimportant 12 year old boy whose mischievous behavior, trying to 
steal a bicycle, had landed him in this quandary. [quoted in Bach et al. 
2012: 111-112] 
 
On further research, Tse discovered that of the 113 countries where torture was 
found to take place, 93 had passed laws ensuring the right to legal counsel and the 
right not to be tortured (TED Talk 2011). Several of these laws were passed as 
part of IMF and World Bank “Second Generation conditionalities” (see Stokke 
2009; Davis & Trebilcock 2001). This was therefore not a problem of passing 
Western common law reforms at the state level, but a problem of administering 
and enforcing those laws at the local level. 
 Difficulties of transplantation have two dimensions that are relevant here. 
In line with the arguments of Trubek & Galanter (1974), Merryman (1977), Golub 
(2007), and Green (1997) it is often not enough to transplant Western institutions 
to developing countries without also transforming local attitudes towards 
criminality, and doing away with customary practices of legality that may be at 
odds with the Western legal framework. This need not be taken as a case of moral 
relativism (see Green 1997: 51); it just means that different norms can emerge out 
of different cultural and historical circumstances. Tse observed of the prison guard 
on duty at the 12-year-old boy’s cell that he  
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did not appear concerned that I was talking to this boy who bore 
obvious signs of beating. They didn’t have much to hide; the use of 
force to extract confessions was just a part of standard police 
operating procedures. [Tse 2008: 111] 
 
Tse understands this normative behaviour as one legacy of Pol Pot and the Khmer 
Rouge, rather than as a long-rooted Cambodian cultural norm (ibid). The second 
relevant problem of transplantation is also related to regimes such as the Khmer 
Rouge: the post-conflict decimation of legal sector capability. Tse believes that at 
the end of the Khmer Rouge period “fewer than ten attorneys had survived”, and 
no “structures or procedures were in place to implement” the new criminal 
procedural code (ibid). In post-conflict Rwanda and Burundi, post-Cultural 
Revolution China, and impoverished Zimbabwe there is a similar situation 
(IBJ.org 2013b; IBJ.org 2013c; IBJ.org 2013d; IBJ.org 2013e).          
 IBJ’s country programmes are all built on the same model. Employing an 
“IBJ Country Fellow”, the organisation opens “Defender Resource Centers” 
(DRCs) – essentially law offices – to serve as headquarters in the field. In 
Cambodia, the Fellow is Ouk Vandeth, who was a student at a Buddhist 
monastery before the rise of the Khmer Rouge forced him into a labor camp. After 
witnessing extensive torture there, Vandeth became a public defender after his 
release, and at the time when Tse approached him to join IBJ in 2007, he was 
working for an NGO that focused on protection of the legal rights of the poor 
(Bach et. al. 2012: 115). This engagement of deeply committed, locally-operating 
legal professionals is a standard part of IBJ’s approach. Apart from the China and 
Singapore programmes, which together employ four American staff, all IBJ 
country programme staff members reside and were born locally (IBJ.org 2013f).   
From the DRCs, country programme staff carry out a number of activities which, 
taken together, are meant to provide direct technical legal assistance to indigent 
accused individuals, and initiatives to entrench criminal rights and defense in the 
institutional fabric of the country (see the following sub-chapter).  
 One of the most interesting aspects of IBJ’s approach is that it works in a 
partnership role with governments, as well as other local NGOs. Taylor (2004 and 
2006) has written extensively on the phenomenon of NGOs working in 
partnership with government officials in Russia, and has identified three discrete 
CSO approaches, which he refers to as “Civil Society I”, “Civil Society II”, and 
“Civil Society III.” Civil Society I is concerned with “civic norms”, educating 
citizens about the “norms and values” within “a liberal democracy”; Civil Society 
II is concerned with staying “autonomous” from the government in order to act 
“as a potential counter-weight to an over-reaching state; and “Civil Society III...  
stresses the possibility of a more positive relationship of mutual assistance and 
partnership between the state and civil society” (Taylor 2006: 195-196). 
According to Thomas Carothers, “this [third] approach is gaining ground in 
democracy assistance programmes” and “civil society programmes… in 
transitional countries now typically seek a productive dialogue with state 
institutions and view state and civil society as partners more than opponents” 
(quoted in Taylor 2006: 196).        
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 Because it employs both state partnership and grassroots rights-awareness 
activities, IBJ’s approach is a hybrid of Civil Society I and III. In an article 
written about IBJ for Innovations, IBJ board member and editor for The 
Economist, Kenneth Cukier, writes that “[t]he IBJ method is novel. Most human 
rights groups take the opposite approach. Rather that work with governments, 
they relish their role as outside agitators. To work within the system would seem 
tantamount to condoning it” (Cukier 2008: 136). With regard to Human Rights 
Watch, he also writes that the “naming and shaming” approach is “vitally 
important, yet leaves the fundamental problems unaddressed” (Cukier 2008: 136). 
In a grant proposal to the Buckminster Fuller Institute, IBJ highlighted this 
difference between itself and the two more famous organisations, while also 
implying that government elites have an economic interest in IBJ’s intervention:  
Human Rights Watch seeks to document and expose particularly 
egregious cases of human rights violations, but does not work to repair 
the troubled regimes that it rebukes. Similarly, Amnesty 
International’s classic letter-writing campaigns to mobilize public 
opinion, while effective with respect to individual cases, do not seek 
the transformation of entire criminal justice systems. International 
Bridges to Justice also seeks to end human rights abuses. But its 
approach is completely unique. IBJ recognizes that in order to create 
sustainable change at the systemic level, strong relationships with host 
governments are paramount….  Economic prosperity cannot exist 
where laws are regularly ignored and crimes regularly go unpunished. 
It is thus in the interest of everyone, from the most powerful elites to 
the most indigent and helpless, that a justice system actually protects 
people’s fundamental human rights. [IBJ BFI Proposal 2013] 
IBJ has therefore signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with every 
country’s Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in which it operates, as well as with several 
law NGOs and bar associations.  
4.2 Activities 
4.2.1 Defender trainings 
IBJ’s training of local public defenders takes various forms depending on the 
country programme. In China, the oldest and second most well-established 
programme after Cambodia, training workshops, “Lawyers Salons”, and symposia 
have been held in Beijing, X’ian, and Wuhan (IBJ China DRC Report 2012). 
These have been attended by thousands of lawyers. In the newer and less-funded 
programmes in Africa, trainings take the form of more modest workshops of often 
less than 50 participants (IBJ EuropeAid Report 2012). In either case, the 
principle is the same. The trainings are hosted by local staff and bar association 
partners; and American lawyers, often Tse’s personal friends working on a pro 
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bono basis, are flown in to give extra instruction and mentorship. As well as 
learning best practices relevant to local laws, and the IBJ philosophy that torture 
can be prevented by “early access to counsel”, the lawyers are taught to train and 
mentor other lawyers in a similar fashion (IBJ Annual Report 2010: 9). Usually, 
lawyers are given a dedicated seminar about how to tactfully instruct judges mid-
trial in the local laws pertaining to rights abuses (IBJ EuropeAid Report 2012).     
  
4.2.2 Roundtables 
As part of its objective to strengthen rule of law from the inside out, IBJ 
frequently hosts “roundtable” meetings where it brings in various “justice sector 
stakeholders”, such as “lawyers, police, prison officials, prosecutors,… judges” 
civil society representatives, and journalists “to engage with one another and 
identify common ground” (IBJ Vision-Impact Report 2013: 3). These often result 
in “candid discussions about corruption and trust of public officials” (Bach et al. 
2012: 122). The meetings are frequently organised around specific topics or 
themes. For example, Burundi hosted a roundtable in November 2012 on the 
“Rights of the Child” ((IBJ Vision-Impact Report 2013: 6).   
4.2.3 Rights-awareness  
In order to “engage[e] people in awareness of their legal rights” IBJ hosts radio 
rights-awareness broadcasts, hangs posters urging people to “Know Their 
Rights!” in prisons, courthouses, and other government buildings, and goes to the 
streets dispensing rights awareness pamphlets and surveys. 50-150 of these 
“grassroots events” are carried out every year (IBJ EuropeAid Report 2012: 15). 
In Burundi, Zimbabwe, and India, IBJ Country Fellows and staff have visited 
prisons and given rights-awareness lectures to hundreds of prisoners (IBJ 
EuropeAid Report 2012; IBJ Vision-Impact Report 2013).        
4.2.4 Case support 
After the lawyer trainings, IBJ-mobilised lawyers defend a number of detainees 
and accused, usually on an entirely pro bono basis. The numbers vary from 
country-to-country. IBJ lawyers will often seek out prisoners at local prisons and 
interview them to determine who is incarcerated without a scheduled court date.     
4.3 Impact and long-term goals 
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Tables 1-4 denote a portion of IBJ’s quantitative impact over a number of years. 
There are a few things to consider when looking at them. First, a technical point: 
in Cambodia, there is a difference between “IBJ defenders” and “defenders 
trained by IBJ.” The latter are defenders operating officially under IBJ auspices. 
Second, several of the figures are self-reported estimates. For example, IBJ cannot 
know the exact number “of defendants served by those trained” because often 
these are independent lawyers who take cases outside of IBJ’s purview. This is 
not to say that IBJ does not strive for some level of accuracy in its reporting, but it 
does need to be acknowledged. Third, the numbers must be viewed in proportion. 
57, 024 cases handled in China seems like a large number, but that is in 
proportion to a prison population that exceeds an estimated 1.57 million (IBJ 
Annual Report: 10). 
 IBJ normally reports its impact through qualitative evidence, and it does 
have some notable successes in terms of systemic impact. For example, in 
Burundi in 2010:  
 
President Pierre Mkurunziza ordered the immediate release of 
hundreds of non-violent prisoners from his country’s overcrowded 
facilities. His presidential decree allowing this release came as a result 
of several IBJ Roundtable discussions on prison overcrowding. The 
decree quoted IBJ’s slogan ‘Freedom is the rule; detention is the 
exception.’ [IBJ Vision-Impact Report 2013: 6] 
 
Also in Rutana, Burundi, three roundtables were held “to discuss a newly-
proposed criminal procedural law,” which IBJ’s Burundi staff supported (ibid: 3). 
The roundtables were attended by an MP and a Member of Senate. The new 
criminal law was passed by the Parliament and the Senate “promptly” afterwards 
(ibid). Of course it could be argued that Burundi’s Parliament and Senate would 
have passed the legislation anyway, but IBJ, as host of the meetings, was in a 
position to influence legislative policy. In Zimbabwe, 
    
Prosper Kunaka, a 19-year old Zimbabwean man, had already spent 6 
months in pre-trial detention on false charges when Pamela, an IBJ 
legal fellow discovered the case and obtained his release without fee 
in April 2011.  “Free bail” was a practice unheard of before IBJ’s 
intervention in Zimbabwe began.  It is now recognized and routinely 
practiced in the court of Norton, a small town outside Harare.  
Lawyers throughout Zimbabwe now cite this as precedent to secure 
“free bail” in other parts of the country. [ibid: 8]   
 
 There are too many examples like this to go into them all here. Suffice it 
to say that IBJ is in a position to influence policy, and normally this is achieved 
by capitalising on existing laws rather than pushing for reforms. However, it must 
be noted that it is the long-term goal of the organisation to instill Western-style 
public legal aid systems in the countries where it works, and due process rights 
throughout the world (see IBJ.org 2013a). From Bach et. al.: “[our] programmes, 
beginning at the local level, are designed to then trickle up over time, 
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simultaneously creating a sustainable and replicable model while generating 
grassroots demand to which policy makers respond” (Bach et al. 2012: 126). In 
other words, a European-based NGO, made up predominantly of Americans, 
mobilises local people to demand legal sector change.          
 
 
Table 1. “IBJ Scale of Impact – Africa” (IBJ Internal Document 2013a) 
IBJ'S SCALE OF IMPACT - AFRICA + JM 
KEY PERFORMANCE 
INDICATORS PER 
PROGRAM 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Defender Capacity 
Building               
# of trainings held 0 1 3 8 9 12 15 
# of countries 
reached 0 1 3 3 3 3 3 
# of defenders 
trained 0 16 158 184 228 285 356 
# of defendants 
served by those 
trained 0 384 3950 4416 5472 6840 8550 
Judicial System 
Reforms               
# of roundtables held 0 0 8 11 16 20 25 
# of countries 
reached 0 0 2 3 3 3 3 
# of participants to 
roundtables 0 0 124 165 240 300 375 
# of firm 
commitments 
obtained 4 2 19 21 25 31 39 
# of people benefited 
by implementation of 
firm commitments 1200 600 5700 6300 7500 9375 11719 
Awareness Raising 
Campaigns               
# of campaigns 
implemented (all 
media included) 1 2 6 24 30 38 47 
# of countries 
reached 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 
# of people reached 25000 50000 550000 1500000 2000000 2500000 3125000 
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Table 2. “IBJ Scale of Impact – China” (IBJ Internal Document 2013b) 
IBJ'S SCALE OF IMPACT – CHINA 
KEY PERFORMANCE 
INDICATORS PER 
PROGRAM 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Defender Capacity 
Building               
# of trainings held 7 7 15 18 29 35 42 
# of countries reached 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
# of defenders trained 325 434 860 1032 1650 1980 2376 
# of defendants served by 
those trained 7800 10416 20640 24768 39600 47520 57024 
Judicial System Reforms               
# of roundtables held 12 8 10 13 21 25 30 
# of countries reached 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
# of participants to 
roundtables 332 220 300 364 583 999 1213 
# of firm commitments 
obtained 5 3 3 6 10 12 14 
# of people benefited by 
implementation of firm 
commitments 507 558 776 931 1489 1786 2143 
Awareness Raising 
Campaigns               
# of campaigns 
implemented (all media 
included) 4 3 2 3 5 6 7 
# of countries reached 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
# of people reached 26300 15000 45280 54336 72448 86937 104324 
Online courses               
# of people who 
completed online courses 0 0 0 54 1080 1890 2700 
# of courses offered 0 0 0 1 20 35 50 
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Table 3. “IBJ Scale of Impact – Cambodia” (IBJ Internal Document 2013c) 
IBJ'S SCALE OF IMPACT – CAMBODIA 
KEY PERFORMANCE 
INDICATORS PER 
PROGRAM 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Defender Capacity 
Building               
# of trainings held 3 3 5 9 11 13 16 
# of countries 
reached 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
# of defenders 
trained 40 64 250 300 360 432 518 
# of defendants 
served by those 
trained(average lawyer 
defending an estimated 30 
cases per yr) 120 1920 7 500 9 000 10 800 12 960 15 552 
# of cases 
represented by IBJ 
lawyers 30 60 517 1044 1 380 1 296 1 555 
Judicial System 
Reforms               
# of roundtables 
held 1 3 5 10 12 14,4 17 
# of countries 
reached 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
# of participants to 
roundtables 50 150 495 990 1 188 1 425 1 711 
# of firm 
commitments 
obtained 1 2 5 10 12 14,4 17 
# of people 
benefited by 
implementation of 
firm commitments 
(average number of people 
benefitted estimated at 200) 1000 2 000 5 000 10 000 12 000 14 400 17 280 
Awareness Raising 
Campaigns               
# of campaigns 
implemented (all 
media included) 13 20 45 60 72 86 104 
# of countries 
reached 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
# of people reached  455 800 7,001,469 7 300 000 7 360 000 7 720 000 7 864 000 
Online courses               
# of people who 
completed online 
courses 0 0 0         
# of courses offered 0 0 0         
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Table 4. IBJ’s progress handling cases in Cambodia 2008-2011. [Bach et al. 2012: 127]  
Year Total number of 
clients 
Number of bail application 
approved 
Number of reduced 
sentences 
Number of 
acquittals and 
dismissals 
2008 60 42 7 10 
2009 517 185 37 86 
2010 1044 215 343 181 
2011 1380 175 348 77 
Total 3, 001 617 735 354 
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5 Discussion & Conclusion – how can 
we evaluate legitimacy in the case of 
IBJ? 
As previously stated, IBJ works to spread and strengthen rule of law norms 
internationally through initiatives such as the 12 Year Plan to End Torture, and it 
also operates at the national level through its country programmes. Although 
Uhlin’s questions for evaluating democratic legitimacy were devised to pertain to 
transnational actors, I see no reason why many of them cannot also be applied to 
CSOs that operate at the national level. Therefore, most of Uhlin’s questions are 
relevant to IBJ on two different levels. 
5.1 Democratic input legitimacy 
Table 6. “Questions for evaluating democratic legitimacy of transnational actors” 
(from Uhlin 2010: 33) 
Input Legitimacy 
 
Representation 
 
How representative is the actor of its constituency? 
What is the quality of electoral representation? 
What is the quality of non-electoral mechanisms of authorization by stakeholders? 
 
Inclusion 
 
To what extent are those significantly affected included in decision-making, deliberation, 
and other activities? 
To what extent does the actor give voice to marginalized people? 
 
Throughput Legitimacy 
 
Transparency  
 
To what extent are decision-making processes and other activities open and transparent? 
 
Accountability 
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According to what principles is the actor accountable? 
To which stakeholders is the actor accountable? 
Does accountability involve control and sanctions or voluntary responsiveness? 
 
Participation 
 
What are the forms and quality of participation? 
 
Deliberation 
 
To what extent is deliberation characterized by critical reflection? 
 
Output Legitimacy 
 
Consequences 
 
What are the democratic consequences of the actor’s activities? 
Does the actor contribute to the democratization of global governance, and it so, how? 
 
Immediately we run into the challenge of defining IBJ’s “constituency,” and in 
this case, I argue that it should be defined in congruence with Goodin’s (op. cit.) 
and Grant & Keohane’s (op. cit.) “all significantly-affected” principle. As a CSO 
concerned with macro-level social and political change, and working in 
partnership with the government, IBJ’s initiatives have the potential to 
significantly affect everyone in society. However, how well does IBJ represent 
everyone in the countries where it works?  
 The first point here is that IBJ works to uphold penal code legislation, but 
what was the democratic quality of the processes which first led to the 
implementation of this legislation? In Rwanda, for example, legislation is passed 
by an elected parliament, but in 2008, representatives of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front ran unopposed (Nyulawglobal.org 2007: Afp.com 2008). In total, five of the 
countries where IBJ works to strengthen laws “on the books” have low quality of 
political representation according to FreedomHouse.org (Freedomhouse.org 
2013a; Freedomhouse.org 2013b; Freedomhouse.org 2013c; Freedomhouse.org 
2013d; Freedomhouse.org 2013e). We do not need to entertain the idea that due 
process rights and the right not to be tortured might be considered undesirable by 
some portion of the electorate; the point is, desirable or not, the laws that IBJ 
seeks to enforce might not have been passed democratically. 
 Second, although IBJ seeks to protect the rights of marginalised 
individuals and to help them out of unfortunate circumstances, it does not, as of 
yet, include them directly in decision-making processes. By this I mean that poor 
individuals, or civil society organisations representing them, are not routinely 
included at deliberative meetings, such as the roundtables. If the voice of the 
indigent accused is heard at roundtables, it is through the lawyers. However, it 
could be argued that IBJ does give voice to indigent accused individuals by 
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helping them to get their day in court. It could also be argued that when IBJ helps 
to get a prisoner acquitted, it is setting them free to participate in the political and 
social life of a free citizen, but their situation before they were incarcerated – 
which may include poverty, or being subject to an undemocratic state – will 
probably not have changed. On the other hand, IBJ could probably be credited 
with empowering local legal professionals who might have come from poor or 
marginalised circumstances. It also strives to educate people in their legal rights, 
which, although it is not “giving voice”, is potentially empowering.  
 In this context, giving voice to the poor and marginalised might look 
something like what Golub (op. cit.) advocates. Golub is concerned with the 
“legal empowerment” of the poor, which “involves”: 
 
an emphasis on directly strengthening the roles, capacities and power 
of the disadvantaged and civil society, as opposed to focusing on state 
institutions. A legal empowerment programme will select issues and 
strategies flowing from the evolving needs and preferences of the 
poor, rather than starting with a pre-determined, top-down focus on 
judiciaries or other state institutions. Particular attention will be paid 
to administrative agencies, local governments, non-state justice 
systems, media, community-organising, group formation or other 
processes and organisations that can help advance the rights and well-
being of the poor, rather than a focus on a narrowly defined justice 
sector…. Legal empowerment should seek to pay greater attention to 
domestic ideas and initiatives, or experience from other developing 
countries, rather than Western imports. [ibid: 10] 
 
This is not to say that IBJ is not, to a commendable extent, concerned with the 
plight of the poor and marginalised. Nor is it to say that IBJ does not engage with 
the grassroots. What is a matter of debate is to what extent IBJ addresses root 
causes of criminality, or helps grassroots and community actors to have their say 
in the formation of domestic legal policy.     
 
             
5.2 Democratic throughput legitimacy 
There are two ways in which we can view IBJ’s democratic throughput 
legitimacy, or democratic control. Either as the democratic qualities that are 
present during the organisation’s activities, or as the democratic, throughput-
related outcomes that it achieves or tries to achieve. The former relates more to 
Uhlin’s questions concerning the democratic credentials of the organisation itself, 
while the latter has to do with its democratising impact on an undemocratic 
country. This is one example of how the “components” are not always easy to 
separate; sometimes one actor’s output can be another actor’s throughput.      
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 As for the first understanding, I will deal here briefly with transparency, 
accountability, and deliberation. IBJ’s decision-making processes and activities 
are transparent to a certain number of stakeholders. This would include the 
government, IBJ’s partners in local civil society and bar associations, donors, and 
others who are directly involved in the organisation’s activities and deliberative 
processes. Related to the questions of inclusion in the previous sub-chapter, some 
of IBJ’s activities would not be transparent to all of the people whom its activities 
might affect, specifically, ordinary citizens not involved in decision-making 
processes. When IBJ members meet at roundtables with a specific group of 
officials to deliberate over a specific issue in the legal system, what was said, how 
it was said, and what was decided will only be available to a select group of 
people. In this case, we have traded-off of transparency for deliberation. This has 
led to several beneficial outcomes (see sub-chapter 4.3), which could be credited 
to a high level of “critical reflection” in certain stakeholders, but the democratic 
legitimacy as we have defined it is questionable. 
 The same could be said for IBJ’s accountability. There are no formal 
mechanisms in place for IBJ to be held accountable to ordinary citizens. However, 
some would argue that IBJ’s MoUs with undemocratic governments might make 
them too accountable to the state. For example, Gready (op. cit.) elucidates how 
one rule of law NGO, the French Penal Reform Internationl (PRI), had its mission 
derailed due to its partnership with an overbearing Rwandan government. Also, 
several examples of the pitfalls of not enough CSO autonomy are presented in 
Hulme & Edwards (1997).   
5.3 Democratic output legitimacy  
IBJ does, however, try to increase citizen’s democratic control in certain ways 
within the limits of its own objectives. This is exemplified by its rights-awareness 
campaigns – trying to empower citizens by making them aware of their legal 
rights under the laws of their own countries – and by its long-term goal to make 
policymakers more responsive to grassroots demand that those rights be upheld. 
 However, this brings up some ambiguities in our theoretical framework. 
With regard to democratic legitimacy, is it enough to try to strengthen legal rights 
institutions when working in, and partnering with, an undemocratic state? 
Returning to the issues raised by Pallas, even if IBJ has some ability to increase 
democratic control in the very specific way mentioned above, does its position as 
a partner of the state allow it enough freedom to affect long lasting change? 
Because it does not attempt to “reform and replace” undemocratic regimes 
directly, does it fail as a “revolutionary?” Or, do its attempts to strengthen certain 
rights institutions leave it in a democratic legitimacy grey area?  
 IBJ does fulfill part of Pallas’s criteria for democratic legitimacy as an 
“authority”, because, in its endeavour to uphold universal human rights norms, it 
has had significant success “protecting fundamental rights” in several countries. 
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Should we then say that IBJ has a moderate amount of democratic legitimacy as 
an “authority”, but no democratic legitimacy as a “revolutionary”? 
 Perhaps we must agree with Pallas’s and Uhlin’s assertions that 
democratic legitimacy needs to be judged based purely on democratising 
outcomes. However, I would argue that this is not a simple task either, because 
initiatives in the present may not bear fruit until sometime in the distant future. 
Must we say that IBJ has no democratic legitimacy at present, until we have seen, 
in the fullness of time, whether or not its initiatives eventually helped in the 
reformation or replacement of the undemocratic regime?  Or can we say that IBJ’s 
intentions qualify it for some democratic legitimacy now? 
 So where does this leave us with regard to evaluating IBJ’s democratic 
legitimacy? When the dust settles, it is not completely clear whether or not IBJ 
“has” democratic legitimacy. If we are to try and evaluate it using our theoretical 
framework as a yardstick, or as a checklist, then I think we have determined that 
IBJ does not have categorical democratic legitimacy. However, we have also seen 
that the organisation has had a significant positive impact on the countries where 
it works. It could thus be argued that IBJ has high levels of moral and technocratic 
legitimacy. This trading off of democratic legitimacy – as embodied by a 
“revolutionary” role contra to an undemocratic state -- for other types of 
legitimacy is shown by Taylor (2006) to be a potentially parallel characteristic 
among many “Civil Society III” organisations. Like the Russian CSOs Taylor is 
concerned with, IBJ’s “fortunes” are “dependent on a small number of committed 
and well-placed individuals”, and because it relies so heavily on government 
cooperation and acquiescence (not to mention foreign donor funding), “the long-
term sustainability of [its] work” could be “in doubt” (Taylor 2006: 208). Also in 
congruence with Taylor, it is necessary to point out that we need not “insist on 
one model of NGO activity” (Taylor 2006: 209); those aspects of democratic 
legitimacy that are traded off by a Civil Society III organisation in the execution 
of its approach, can be, and often are, taken up by a Civil Society II organisation 
operating in the same country.             
 It is also important to remember Uhlin’s caveat about using one standard 
of “operational criteria” to gauge all instances of legitimacy. Harkening back to 
sub-chapter 3.1.1, legitimacy is not only context-derived in the manner which 
Pallas elucidates, but socially-constructed. How an academic or a government 
official evaluates the legitimacy of an organisation might differ completely from 
how an individual citizen might.   
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